by eilidh McnaughtonWhy do people care about justice? Why do people some people care about justice more than others? What do people consider as fair and unfair? These are some typical questions that psychological justice research has been exploring for many years. Research seeking to understand what underlies individual people's views of justice have mainly focussed on three topics: Justice motivations, personality traits, and the “moral self” (Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, 2016). Justice motivations Many theories that have influenced social justice research assume that humans are predisposed to maximise their self-interest. Whilst this might be the case, some researchers have hit back at this claim, arguing that people are also motivated to seek justice. There is, in fact, evidence to support this view (Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, 2016). First, people respond to positive and not just negative equity. For example, they do not just disapprove of being underpaid but also work harder when they earn more than they are entitled to or when their status has increased (Greenberg, 1988). People are also willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to help restore justice in the world e.g., by donating money to charity, even if they do not directly profit from these efforts (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). These actions do not make sense if people are only motivated by self-interest but can be explained by a motivation for justice. It is likely that this human motivation evolved gradually through natural selection. Our prehistoric ancestors banded together in small groups and had to build positive relations between members based on trust, cooperation, and equity. There was a pressure on the group to share a concern for justice, requiring group members to expect to get what they deserve in terms of resources and social standing. This has been passed onto to modern day humans (Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, 2016). Personality traits Differing personality traits have been suggested as an explanation for why people have different views of justice. Some people are more motivated by a desire to maximise their self-interest or to maximise the joint outcome for all people in a situation. In social situations, people in the former group see non-cooperation as the most rational thing to do, whereas those in the latter see cooperation as most rational (van Lange et al., 1990). Those in the former group also view social dilemmas as a decision between being weak and strong. On the other hand, those in the latter group see these dilemmas as a decision between being moral and immoral (Liebrand et al., 1986). Some people also have what is called high ‘victim sensitivity’. This means that they are very cautious about being exploited by others and, as a result, act more egotistically in order to avoid the possibility of being exploited or, in other words, experiencing injustice (Gollwitzer et al., 2013). Finally, certain people seem to believe more strongly in a just world than others. People who believe that the world is just are more likely to think that they are, overall, fairly treated by their peers, teachers, parents, and other authority figures (Dalbert, 2009). The moral self People want to see themselves as fair and moral, even if they act in unjust ways. Researchers have indeed shown that people often do not practice what they preach; they demand others to behave in moral ways, but do not live up to these standards themselves (Batson et al., 1999). When acting unjustly, people use a range of strategies to try and maintain a rosy view of themselves. They may come up with moral justifications for their actions, for example, by arguing that it is acceptable to hurt someone that has harmed you. People also may use advantageous comparisons such as arguing that stealing an item of clothing is nothing compared to stealing a car. People also deny or diffuse responsibility for the harm they have caused, minimise the negative impact of their actions or even blame those they have harmed. These strategies help people to avoid seeing themselves in a negative light (Bandura, 2002). Some of this research can paint a dark picture of human morality, implying that people are not always interested in morality and justice but in upholding a favourable view of themselves. However, there is also a lot of evidence that people are strongly motivated by issues of morality and justice in many situations and so there is hope for us yet! References
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